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The article contributes to current theoretical debates about the political significance of narrative 
imagination by drawing on Albert Camus’s and Hannah Arendt’s existentially-grounded 
aesthetic judging sensibility. It seeks to displace the prevalent tendency to probe literature for 
its moral-philosophical insights, and instead delves into the experiential reality of our 
engagement with literary works. It starts from Martha Nussbaum’s recognition of the literary 
ability to account for the fragility of human affairs, yet finds her reduction of narrative 
imagination to the role of furthering moral lessons wanting politically. Against this 
background, the article reclaims Camus’s and Arendt’s dialogical-representative judging 
orientation and its insight into the narrative ability to respond to the intersubjective character 
of political action. As such, their aesthetic sensibility reveals the potential political significance 
of literary imagination in its capacity to open a public space where the contradictions of our 
situated existence can be confronted through politics between plural equals. 
 
Keywords: ethics of narrative, aesthetic judgement, Hannah Arendt, Albert Camus, Martha 
Nussbaum, worldly recognition 
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 Of late, thinkers from diverse theoretical perspectives have explored the ethical and political 
value of narrative voice, awarding literary imagination a significant role in practical judgement. 
Within this turn, as articulated in its prominent contemporary proponent Martha Nussbaum, 
literary imagination is praised for its ability to displace our understanding of judgement as an 
abstract exercise in the application of universal standards. Narrative-inspired judgement, 
instead, is conceived as a reflective activity of recognizing others and events in their particular 
situational complexity, and of stimulating our capacity of an adequate response. As such, 
narrative imagination is well-suited to confront the “fragility of goodness” in a world of 
politics, as a realm of human communal, context-specific choices and actions that is 
characterized by plurality and unpredictability and that therefore eludes the grasp of pre-
fabricated moral rules.1 Nevertheless, this exploration of the ethical value of narrative retains 
a theoretical, rationalist penchant. Even though Nussbaum sets to examine the lived reality of 
our engagement with literary works, the emphasis lies primarily on probing literature for its 
moral-philosophical insights,2 rather than its political potential. Conceiving of the ethics of 
reading as an activity of self-cultivation, Nussbaum’s account confines literary imagination to 
the role of furthering moral lessons, while falling short of adequately exploring how narrative 
might help us face the vagaries of political affairs. 
 Against this background, this article aims to reclaim an alternative perspective on the 
political import of narrative voice: the historically-attuned, existential orientation of Hannah 
Arendt and Albert Camus. In rebellion against traditional philosophy’s taste for abstract 
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reasoning, the two thinkers share an existential commitment to bringing political thinking back 
to the realm of human lived experience. Their attempts to rethink political judgement along the 
lines of aesthetic sensibility were shaped by an awareness of the loss of metaphysical 
guarantees in modernity. This recognition led them to a deep appreciation of the perplexities 
of political affairs, theorizing them as stemming from the ambiguity of our human condition as 
both free and situated beings. Yet, their aesthetic sensibility is distinguished for its specifically 
worldly, political focus. In contrast to the lingering vestiges of subjectivism they perceived in 
the tradition of existentialist philosophy, Camus and Arendt confronted the ambiguity of 
political affairs through a distinct dialogic, representative judging orientation. Their dialogical 
focus foregrounds the political relevance of narrative at the fundamental existential level. 
Narrative is not understood as a conveyor of any specific truth content or way of reasoning, but 
intimates a mode of understanding aimed at making sense of human worldly experience.3 This 
underlying existential import of narrative echoes the recent calls for a sustained exploration of 
the features of narrative and the process of narrative interaction that underpin its political 
relevance.4 Camus’s and Arendt’s contribution rests in retaining attention on the situated 
character of aesthetic judgement, envisioning narrative sensibility as an activity of negotiating 
the plurality of perspectives and disclosing a shared world as an intersubjective space for the 
appearance of political action. On this basis, the article suggests how our engagement with 
literary works can strengthen our capacity of political action, understood as a specifically 
human ability of assuming responsibility for and freely responding to the intricacies of our 
world – rather than fleeing them in dreams of moral purity. 
 The argument proceeds as follows. The first section reconstructs the main concerns guiding 
Nussbaum’s ethics of narrative, while exposing its limitations. The second section engages the 
perspectives of Arendt and Camus. Contrary to Nussbaum’s philosophical focus, it reveals how 
their aesthetic sensibility places narrative in the service of confronting the ambiguity of 
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political action and answering to the pressing need for intersubjective recognition that follows 
from the weakened validity of traditional verities. The third section undertakes an exploration 
of our lived engagement with literary works, contrasting Nussbaum’s ethics of reading with 
Camus’s and Arendt’s aesthetic reimaginings of political judgement. Narrative ethics as self-
cultivation is guided by the moral concern with ensuring a proper way of grasping others’ 
experience (of suffering and injustice), while abstracting from the plurality of the world. The 
existential thinkers’ aesthetic imagination, in contrast, can foster worldly forms of recognition 
and thus constantly disclose the possibilities and limitations of political action inhering in our 
situated political coexistence. 
 
 
 Nussbaum and Ethics of Narrative as Self-cultivation 
 
 First articulated in her 1983 essay on Henry James’s Golden Bowl, Nussbaum’s ethics of 
reading rests on a rejection of the predominant tendency within (Anglo-American) political 
theory to separate the realms of moral philosophy and literature, and relegate the latter to a 
marginal role within the sphere of ethics.5 Literary form, Nussbaum argues, “is, itself, a part of 
content – an integral part, then, of the search for and statement of truth.” This acknowledgement 
leads the author to consider the narrative attentiveness to the world’s “complexity and 
mysteriousness, its flawed and imperfect beauty” as an essential part of ethical reflection.6 The 
challenge to the divide between the realms of philosophy and literature implies a 
reconsideration of the judging activity and ethics as such. The ability to judge is no longer 
understood primarily as knowledge of universal rules and their application onto particular 
cases. Narrative sensibility foregrounds judgement as a reflective ability of just perception and 
responsiveness to the concrete situation at hand.7  
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 Nussbaum’s narrative ethics attempts to provide a corrective to “the abstractness of the 
Enlightenment thinking,” in particular to Kantian and Utilitarian perspectives, which reduce 
moral reasoning to detached philosophical speculation, while abstracting from the experiential 
character of human life.8 Invoking Aristotelian sources, she links narrative inquiry to the 
question of how human beings should live, to accounting for emotive, practical dimensions of 
ethical and political choices and actions as they are lived by finite and imperfect beings such 
as ourselves.9 Nussbaum’s literary sensibility comes to embody a quest for a humanist ethics 
better attuned to world’s plurality and contingency, “uncontrolled events” and “tragic 
reversals” that importantly shape our potentials to live a good life.10 Narrative imagination can 
do this because it breaks with the Enlightenment philosophy’s emphasis on the autonomous 
self that is able to know and master the whole of reality. Our humanity, instead, consists in a 
constant cultivation of attentiveness to the complexity of life that precisely cannot be dissolved 
into the subject’s pre-fabricated thought-frame.11 Accordingly, Nussbaum seeks to unearth “not 
the morality that is caused by reading,” but “the morality of the act of reading.”12 The purpose 
is to delve into the lived experience of reading as a “communal endeavour” by which we are 
“constituted” as a community of responsible spectators of political events and incited to reflect 
upon feasible forms of “living together.”13    
 Commending the role of literary imagination in the public sphere, Nussbaum places at the 
forefront its ability to further recognition across difference, such as that of class, race, nation 
or gender, characterizing the pluralism of contemporary life. Literary imagination improves 
our capacity of judgement because it guards against “refusals to see,” those lapses of attention 
where we view others as abstract entities or mere means to greater ends.14 It teaches us to see 
others as human beings that are both different from us and bound to us by our “common 
vulnerability,” “similar weaknesses and needs, as well as similar capacities for achievement.”15 
In this way, it is possible to give voice to silenced members of society and denounce the 
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injustices committed against them, yet bear in mind that they are not passive objects of our 
benevolent gaze. At the same time, this position makes us less prone to treat different others as 
wholly alien or evil, but recognize them as rightful participants in deliberation about common 
goals.16 
 This appeal of literature, however, is envisioned to proceed by way of stimulating our 
“knowledge of possibilities.”17 Drawing on Aristotle, Nussbaum believes literature intimates 
the process of judging because it introduces us to a plethora of events “that might happen,” 
reveals “their impact on human lives” and allows us to evaluate in general terms the 
“possibilities for being human.”18 This is because the reader can imagine what it would feel 
like to be struck by the same misfortunes as those plaguing the literary characters, but is 
sufficiently distanced to be capable of critical judgement.19 An engagement with literature then 
occurs in the controlled solitary space of the reader’s inner self. Literature, as Vasterling notes, 
assumes the role of an “ethics lab,” where we can train our capacities of adequate response 
without the intrusion of contingency that confronts us in the outer world.20 The experience of 
reading is seen primarily as an act of self-cultivation or a fostering of one’s character. Texts 
are engaged as carriers of moral “paradigms,” which the readers are supposed to extrapolate 
and apply to their own situations.21 
 The troubling political implications of this self-centred penchant are visible in the way 
Nussbaum envisions our engagement with literature to lead to the desired goal of recognizing 
others as our equals in their very particularity. The process of responding to others’ 
perspectives proceeds by virtue of a constant interplay “between the general and the concrete,” 
between general human needs, and the ways these are furthered or impeded by particular social 
and political arrangements.22 Yet, the crux of desired recognition remains directed on the inner 
self, a margin of interiority that is transcendent to its worldly existence and its interaction with 
others.23 What is presupposed is “a generalizable moral consciousness,”24 which is applied as 
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a standard of judgement between different historical arrangements. In this respect, ethics of 
narrative as self-cultivation lingers within a monological perspective, recognizing only “what 
fits our [already established] frame of reference,” to the exclusion of other perspectives.25 
Nussbaum’s account presupposes a shared conception of humanity that must first be brought 
into existence through a consideration of a plurality of equally valuable “imagining and 
thinking and feeling” acts of the different members of the reading community.26 
 This important limitation of Nussbaum’s narrative ethics can be attributed to its exploration 
of the purpose of literature within the framework of a philosophical inquiry into the ways of a 
good life. Despite its emphasis on the “mystery, conflict, and riskiness of the lived deliberative 
situation,” literary engagement is placed primarily in the role of developing the arguments of 
moral philosophy and stirring in the audience “a recognition of ethical truths.”27 This focus 
disregards the important difference between the inner world of philosophical inquiry and the 
outer world of politics. Nussbaum’s literary judgement thus retains the (philosophical) 
temptation towards managing the plurality and complexity of life in line with a preconceived 




 Camus, Arendt and the World-disclosing Potentials of Narrative 
 
 A fruitful alternative to the lingering philosophical penchant of Nussbaum’s model, 
Camus’s and Arendt’s existentially-grounded aesthetic perspectives are explicitly oriented to 
accounting for the ambiguity of political judgement and action after the modern loss of eternal 
standards. Their aesthetic sensibility has often been chided for harbouring individualist, even 
aestheticist tendencies that are hardly adequate to answer the pressing concerns of politics in 
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contemporary world. In contrast, this section argues that their dialogic, representative judging 
orientation is distinct for its ability to confront the intersubjective, worldly character of political 
action. It traces their respective engagements with what they perceived to be the dangers of 
subjectivism and excess present in attempts to conceive of political judgement on the model of 
aesthetic practice. It reveals the political significance of Camus’s dialogic conception of 
creativity in its refusal of final answers, to retain attention to disclosing the limits of the world 
and of different others. It then delves into Arendt’s articulation of the specifically political 
function of narrative imagination in its ability to cultivate the worldly space for political 
action.29 
 Camus’s and Arendt’s aesthetic sensibility arose in response to a series of twentieth-century 
events, whose terrifying novelty reached its peak in the advent of totalitarian crimes. This 
upsurge of “what should not have happened,” for them, irreversibly destroyed the established 
moral standards of the Western philosophical tradition and ensued in a profound crisis of 
political judgement and action in modernity.30 The modern loss of eternal standards was not an 
abstract philosophical problem, but revealed a more fundamental predicament of human 
existence, touching upon our very ability to understand experience and engage in meaningful 
political action. As conveyed in Camus’s insights into the absurd condition of human existence, 
individuals have found themselves situated in an incomprehensible world “divested of illusions 
and lights,” of those absolute values that used to provide reasons for judging and acting.31 In 
The Myth of Sisyphus, Camus explicates this condition as a “confrontation” between the human 
need for understanding and “the unreasonable silence of the world” – which also binds the two 
together into an indissoluble unity.32 The absurd sensibility thereby illuminates the historical, 
worldly condition of human existence and the ensuing ambiguity of political judgement. 
Human beings are not pure cogitos, but are deeply immersed in the world as an inescapable 
horizon of experience and so cannot reach a completely transparent view of the given situation. 
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This awareness of the limits of human reason contains the existential-phenomenological 
challenge to the tradition of political theory, dispensing with its quest for metaphysical 
absolutes and eternal standards of morality as but futile attempts to “transcend” and “refine” 
this life, only to ultimately “betray it.”33 What is required, Camus argues, is a thorough 
rethinking of political judgement as an aesthetic practice, whose rebellion against the absurd is 
affirmed in free creation. 34 The distinctive mark of such aesthetic judgement is that it does not 
aim to subsume the phenomenal character of the world under pre-fabricated standards, but 
affirms its independent existence and revels in finding meaning in its untameable particularity 
and plurality.35 This appeal is explicitly formulated in Arendt’s attempt to reconsider political 
judgement on the model of Kant’s account of aesthetic judgements of taste. Aesthetic 
judgement, as she notes, corresponds to the ability of reflective judgement, where “only the 
particular is given for which the general has to be found.”36 It can assume the ambiguous 
condition of political judgement by engaging every occurrence “in full spontaneity,” without 
reliance on preconceived standards of thought.37 
 These insights into aesthetic judgement as a worldly activity bring to light the utmost 
political import of narrative attentiveness to the particularity of human experience. For Arendt, 
the traditional conception of judgement as application of prefabricated standards was politically 
troubling because it ended up demoting political action to instrumental realization of a pre-
given standard. What philosophers fled from and denied, however, was the distinctly human 
capacity of action. Within Arendt’s oeuvre, politics as a realm of action is experientially 
distinct from both work and labour, two other activities that compose the vita activa or human 
(active) being in the world. Political action involves the manifestation of human plurality, 
consisting of individuals engaging their freedom in the world and beginning anew in the 
company of their peers. If labour is driven by the necessity of the life process and work is 
determined by its end product, it is action with others that reveals our distinct humanity, the 
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“who” rather than the “what” of the actors’ identity, which cannot be grasped with abstract 
categories of thought.38 Grounded in human freedom, it is in the essence of action to interrupt 
any natural or historical chain of causes and effects, and bring into the world something new 
that could not have been known or predicted. Appearing in the midst of the intersubjective 
world, further, its outcomes are bound to remain unpredictable and uncontrollable.39  
 Aesthetic attentiveness to “the particular qua particular” can support the human capacity of 
political action because it is free to salvage particular events from their predetermined place in 
a larger whole. 40 It can thus disclose the “who,” “the revelatory character” of action, and so 
affirm the political sphere as a space of freedom, and not a plaything of larger metaphysical or 
historical forces.41 Or, to state it differently, narrative loyalty to the structure of human action 
answers to the human need to understand experience. As embodied, worldly beings, our sense 
of selves as free beings depends crucially on our capacity of making sense of events, developing 
a sense of the shared or common world as an intersubjective, public space where our actions 
can be seen by others and gain “a humanly comprehensible meaning.”42 Narrative-inspired 
judgement, then, can affirm the human significance of politics because it illuminates past 
occurrences as a living reality in our common world, enriches our sense of the real and helps 
address the intricacies of the present moment.43 It fosters the process of what Arendt calls 
“reconciliation” with ever-changing worldly reality, which simultaneously evokes the 
potentials of human action in the present and the future.44 
 The existential insights into the political relevance of stories reveal a deeper appreciation of 
the importance of intersubjective recognition than that present in Nussbaum’s ethics of 
narrative. With the modern shattering of the coherent whole of Being where each action was 
assigned a pre-determined place, the issue of one’s humanity turns into an open, existential 
question. As Arendt underscores, human freedom lacks the self-evidence of a natural fact, and 
exists only “as a political and as a human reality.”45 Human dignity and the status of a political 
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actor refers to the process of “becoming” human and to the ability of exercising one’s rights, 
which is predicated on the dynamics of receiving and bestowing recognition within the political 
realm. Conversely, the status of a political actor can be denied through failures of recognition 
or practices of misrecognition. Narrative imagination thereby brings out the situated, and 
deeply political, nature of the activity of judging, of affirming bonds of solidarity and resisting 
injustice.46 The awareness that individuals’ humanity is situationally and intersubjectively 
produced, however, also points to the difficulty involved in recognizing others as equals in 
their difference. The acknowledgement of individuals’ political status requires the recognition 
of their autonomy as agents, yet an autonomy that constantly engages the outside world and 
other freedoms.47 
 Camus confronted this ambiguity in his insistence on the “free essence” of creative 
judgement, which arises only from “the constraints it imposes on itself,” and dies of external 
rules.48 Camus is responding to what he perceived as the dangers of “engaged” or “edifying” 
literature, prominent in the existentialism of Jean-Paul Sartre. Camus’s charge to Sartre is 
underlain by his insights into the modern problem of metaphysical rebellion. Rejecting the 
injustice of the human condition, the rebels ended in an unlimited affirmation of human powers 
to mould the whole universe according to their will – a pretension that gains concreteness in 
the excesses of twentieth-century revolutionary movements.49 In Sartre’s desire to respond to 
the ambiguities of a historical situation with a synthesizing vision, Camus discerned just such 
an attempt at solitary mastery that reduces human freedom to realization of pre-conceived ideas 
of justice, while obscuring the plurality of the world.50 Among the left-wing intellectuals of 
Sartre’s camp, Camus’s appreciation of the irremediably tragic character of human existence 
was deplored as an abstention from concrete historical struggles for greater justice.51 For 
Camus, however, the ambiguity of worldly freedom meant that we should limit our aspirations 
to the pursuit of relative values, formed through a consideration of a plurality of other 
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perspectives.52 The aesthetic attentiveness to the limits of human reason here translates into an 
affirmation of human solidarity. Rather than aiming for final answers, Camus’s creative 
judgement is grounded upon an imaginative ability to describe others “faithfully” and “with 
consideration,” to always strive to see them as concrete, embodied freedoms.53 The affirmed 
solidarity is not based on an abstract idea or cause that would seek to press others into 
agreement and ultimately reconcile the different perspectives. It thrives at the “limits where 
minds meet and, in meeting, begin to exist.”54 By a careful attentiveness to the irreducible 
particularity and plurality of the world, Camus’s artistic judgement aimed to reveal the 
individual experiences of suffering, joy and exile as situations shared by all.55 On this basis, it 
strove to bring to light common humanity precisely by embracing the differences that compose 
it and open a platform for dialogue where opposing political groups could “confront one 
another without clashing.”56 
 Arendt builds on the political relevance of this dialogical aesthetic sensibility in her 
reflections on the specifically worldly function of art. The political relevance of stories lies in 
their ability to inspire an attitude of “loving care” for the plurality of the appearing world.57 As 
she writes, aesthetic sensibility intimates the process of judging politically because it concerns 
“not knowledge or truth,” but “the judicious exchange of opinion about the sphere of public 
life and the common world.”58 It is a highly dangerous error, however, to introduce into politics 
the fabricating attitude that brought art works into being and place stories in the service of a 
refinement of one’s character.59 Disregarding the important difference between works of art 
and real life, this tendency succumbs to the belief that it might be possible to “make” politics 
in accordance with a preconceived (aesthetic) ideal.60 As Arendt elaborates in her reflection on 
the troubling political implications of Heidegger’s philosophy, this aestheticist reversal occurs 
when thought refuses wonder to the plurality of the world and turns inward towards itself. 
Rather than affirming the independent existence of the outside world, it mistakenly assumes 
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that the whole of reality can be rendered a function of an inward-oriented cultivation of a 
unique, isolated Self.61 Not only does it further the view of engagement with literature as a 
venue through which to escape the threat of political reality, to view the world “through a veil 
of sweetness and light.”62 Removed from the common world, it also threatens to conceive of 
different others as material to be moulded at will.63 
 Against this danger, Arendt upheld the political promise of stories through her appropriation 
of Kant’s aesthetic judgement as corresponding to the ability of “enlarged mentality” or 
“representative thinking.”64 Representative thinking can face up to the ambiguity of politics 
because, in the reflective process of moving from the particular to the general, it does not aim 
for a solitary position above the realm of human affairs. It proceeds by entertaining a plurality 
of different perspectives on the world. For this aesthetic taste relies crucially on the faculty of 
imagination, which allows it to distance itself from subjective conditions that shape its 
particular perspective, and represent in its mind what reality looks like from other people’s 
viewpoints.65 Importantly, representative thinking is not a matter of trying “to be or to feel like 
somebody else.” The aim is not to reach the innermost kernel of another’s subjectivity, but an 
understanding that comes from looking upon “the same world from one another’s 
standpoint.”66 By constantly articulating a plurality of perspectives on the world, representative 
thinking is capable of cultivating what Arendt, following Kant, calls sensus communis. By this 
she means a “specifically human sense” of what we share in common that enables us to orient 
ourselves in the public realm.67 For Arendt, then, the plurality of political affairs is not 
something to be overcome, but the very condition of bringing into existence a shared, public 
world.68 Rendering things into a matter of discourse between a plurality of different 
perspectives, representative judgement brings into existence a space, where the particular 
occurrences can appear in their worldly, intersubjective meaning.69 Representative aesthetic 
judgement thus answers to the difficulties of intersubjective recognition by revealing humans 
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in the way they appear on the temporal and spatial plane of the common world, in how their 
identities both change and remain the same through their interactions in the political realm. 
This emphasis is crucial because it foregrounds judgement’s ability to recognize humans as 
acting beings, rather than passive instantiations of inhuman forces – as distinct and equal 
members of the public realm. 
 Camus’s and Arendt’s aesthetic sensibility refuses to place narrative into the service of 
providing a new rational foundation for political action. Any such attempt, they warned, might 
stir the focus away from narrative judgement’s political purpose: to retain attention on 
reconciling us with the worldliness of our political co-existence and helping us face the 
intricacies of political action. To explicate the political potential contained in their insights into 
the worldly character of narrative, the next section inquires into the experiential reality of our 
engagement with literary works. It contrasts Nussbaum’s moral concern with ensuring a proper 
way of responding to others’ suffering, with the existential thinkers’ aesthetic emphasis on 
fostering worldly forms of recognition and kindling of a space for political action. 
 
 
 The World of the Narrative as the Space for Politics 
 
 Much like in Nussbaum, the existential thinkers’ insight into the lived reality of our 
engagement with literary works begins with readers’ acknowledgement that narrative is an act 
of world-disclosure, rather than knowledge or truth. It is an appeal to assume responsibility for 
what has been disclosed and take it up as a ground for our own acts of judgement. Camus’s and 
Arendt’s aesthetic loyalty to human plurality, however, holds that, long before we are able to 
retreat into the security of our private space to cultivate our own selves, we are constituted as 
“witnesses or even interlocutors” to different viewpoints on the world.70 In turn, narrative-
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inspired judgement is discouraged from any too simplistic a translation of literary discourse 
into moral lessons that could be applied onto real life. It proceeds by a careful examination of 
both how worldly relationships and structures have conditioned individuals’ thoughts and 
actions, and how these conditions have been assumed in diverse ways by human freedoms.71 
Narrative voice thus incites us to recognize others in their worldly appearance: in their very 
distinctness, it is able to reveal a world that is shared in common. 
 This worldly orientation importantly speaks to the problematic of intersubjective 
recognition, which remains inadequately addressed in Nussbaum’s literary ethics. While 
acknowledging that individuals’ perspectives are historically shaped, her account directs the 
crux of desired recognition at the inner subjectivity of particular characters. In this respect, 
Nussbaum’s ethics of reading betrays the abstract humanist proposition of a self-constituting 
consciousness, which only needs to shed its particular situational constraints to reach its full 
presence to itself. Because it focuses on individuals’ humanity as an inner quality, it for 
instance obscures the ways in which a certain (oppressive) situation is constitutive of their very 
being and may fail to challenge the structures of social and political inequality. This makes 
Nussbaum’s literary imagination vulnerable to the powerful postmodern criticism of the 
narrative ability to represent the irreducible difference of political life. For these critics, 
narrative’s other-directed beautifying gaze ends up imposing on other people the supposedly 
universal values of the privileged. In contrast to its emancipatory aspirations, it risks 
reproducing the hierarchies of social power.72 
 From the existential thinkers’ perspective, however, these troubling political implications 
of Nussbaum’s position arise from its conception of the desired goal of mutual recognition. 
Nussbaum’s inward-directed ethics of narrative remains underpinned by the concern with 
achieving proper, just recognition, mutual intelligibility and security. To argue with Markell, 
it commits a more fundamental, “ontological,” form of misrecognition.73 It envisions the goal 
16 
of mutual recognition between different subjectivities in terms of a self-contained substantiality 
or a predetermined end, lying outside of political relationships and structures in which they are 
inescapably enmeshed. This problem echoes Camus’s and Arendt’s wariness of attempts to 
penetrate to the inner core of the others’ subjectivity and achieve perfect coincidence between 
human consciousnesses. Camus observed that such attempts proceed in accordance with the 
(Hegelian) dialectical conception of intersubjective recognition. While envisioned to end in a 
happy reconciliation of opposing sides, this conception entrenches the division between 
masters and slaves, and amounts to “blind combat,” where final agreement ensues only at the 
expense of eliminating difference.74 It was this desire to achieve complete mutual 
understanding between persons that Arendt warned against as an unpolitical form of human 
togetherness. Shorn of an in-between space of the world, she held, this tendency leads to a unity 
of perspectives that abstracts from the fact of human plurality and diminishes the sense of 
common worldly reality.75 What Nussbaum’s approach lacks, then, is an account of how 
narrative can incite the activity of judging particular experiences, situating them within the 
worldly environment, and disclosing grounds for solidarity across different groupings. Not 
only does it invite the objection of appropriating others’ separate subjectivities, it also risks 
missing out on the intersubjective condition of political action and the attendant 
unpredictability of political life.76 
 These observations are illuminated in Nussbaum’s insightful reading of Henry James’s 
Golden Bowl. Published in 1904, the novel centres on the character of Maggie Verver, tracing 
her journey from childlike (moral) innocence to assuming the complexities of (married) life. 
For Nussbaum, the heroine’s transformation embodies the relevance of literature to moral 
judgement as encapsulated in James’s ideal of “being finely aware and richly responsible.”77 
In the first part of the novel, Maggie’s choices are guided by the aspiration to moral perfection, 
expressed through her harmonious relationship with her father: an aspiration to “never breaking 
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a rule, never hurting.”78 She purports to resolve any conflict of values by subordinating the 
meaning of any opposing claim to the sought-for wholeness of her life – as when she “solves” 
the conflict between the love for her husband and the duty to her father by simply “cutting 
back” the demands of marriage.79 The troubling implications of Maggie’s vision manifest 
Nussbaum’s observation that a strict following of abstract moral ideals entails “extraordinary 
blindness” to people in their particularity and easily paves an enlightened way to “cruelty.”80 
But the crucial insight of the novel Nussbaum traces to its second half, the moment when our 
protagonist finally discovers that humans are “cracked and flawed.”81 Learning of her 
husband’s affair with her best friend and her father’s wife, Charlotte, Maggie is initiated into 
the intricacy and tragedy of life. This new-found attentiveness leads her to find a new rule of 
action in “keen perception” and “vibrant sympathy” of response.82 Yet, what is striking is that 
Maggie’s realization amounts “to a new way of getting at perfection.”83 To save her marriage, 
Maggie “must damage Charlotte,” resorting to “cunning” and “treachery.”84 However, she 
bears this sacrifice of her moral purity by sharpening her sensitivity to the pain she has caused 
and bearing the tragic burden of guilt. Her awareness of the complexities of human affairs 
involves a persistent denial of recognition to others, both Charlotte and her husband, as separate 
subjectivities that cannot be controlled or possessed – not “round,” but “angular,” always 
sticking out of edifying equations.85 Far from “learning” from her “bad” actions, she assumes 
the “dirty” nature of the world and seeks to reclaim her own innocence by being “richly 
conscious” of her “sinning.”86 Nussbaum, to be sure, insists that this example does not so much 
invalidate the value of our striving for fine awareness, as point to how our application of this 
“loving” ideal to specific people or aspects of the world might tragically also nurture our 
blindness to others.87 From Camus’s and Arendt’s worldly perspective, however, it is the very 
process of abstracting from human plurality and common reality underpinning Maggie’s 
striving for transparent vision that also grounds the ease with which it might lend itself to 
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misleading political action. 
 Rather than aiming for identification with others’ perspectives, representative aesthetic 
sensibility explores the immediate experience of suffering in its worldly significance. 
Importantly, such narrative-inspired judgement is not predicated upon any pre-given quality 
that may make us empathize more readily with certain individuals or groups. The 
presupposition that we are able to comprehend other standpoints rests on our recognizing in 
them the same unpredictable plays of freedom and world that constitute our own existence. A 
judgement on the oppressive character of a given situation is not founded upon a pre-conceived 
conception of a good life. It emerges from a consideration of how certain actions have 
obliterated or restrained the ability of certain individuals or groups to exert their freedom in 
practical projects in the world. For instance, we learn to recognize in the various undertakings 
of the oppressed, ranging from complicity to resistance, modes of lived experience in which 
individuals respond to their situation in the world. Further, worldly judgement helps us discern 
how individual acts of misrecognition are enframed by the broader field of institutional and 
structural factors. We thereby also gain insight into the intricate dynamics of complicity in 
unjust practices whose concerted effects lie beyond any individual’s control. Finally, by luring 
us out of our self-contained selves, narrative drives us to reflect on our own situatedness within 
the web of worldly relationships. The political appeal of narratives, then, lies not in their ability 
to inspire empathetic identification with the victims per se, which, as Arendt observed, retains 
the division between those who suffer and their sympathizers.88 It consists of a sense that what 
is at stake in a given oppressive situation is the fate of the common world and that any denial 
of freedom is a concern of the suffering and the non-suffering alike.  
 It is only after such exercises in world-travelling that we engage in what Booth calls 
“second-order valuings,”89 a judgement on how the freedom of certain individuals or groups 
has been denied and what is required to reclaim their political status. Such narrative-inspired 
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judgement, however, does not constitute a wholesome moral community or agreement on an 
appropriate response. To evoke Beausoleil, it does not signify “the mastery of knowledge,” but 
can better be envisioned as “the experience of meeting” – acknowledging the deeply situated 
nature of the encounter as well as the limits of understanding the concrete other.90 It is only 
within this horizon that the inherent connectedness and interdependence as well as separateness 
and “dissymmetry”91 between human consciousnesses comes fully to light. Yet, it is also only 
by revealing how a situation of oppression arose amidst our common world, that representative 
aesthetic sensibility appeals to the human capacities for political action in the present. Only in 
this way, for instance, are we able to recognize in others not eternal victims, but individuals 
whose humanity has been unjustly denied, and disclose grounds for solidarity with them. 
Similarly, only by considering particular commissions (or omissions) of “oppressors” as they 
echoed in the world, are we able to judge them not as inherently evil nor as passive objects of 
larger forces but apportion responsibility in human terms. Furthering an understanding of how 
experiences of injustice arose through worldly interaction between different individuals, 
representative narrative judgement allows former enemies to recognize each other as free 
members of the shared world, rather than “opposing abstractions” confronting each other in an 
eternal struggle.92 
 In this light, the operation of representative aesthetic judgement can be read as an attempt 
to reclaim “the spirit of the gift.”93 In the idea of the gift, on the one hand, is implied a 
presumption on the part of the giver of being able to adequately recognize what the other 
desires, and an appeal for this act of generosity to be acknowledged in gratitude. On the other 
hand, the very idea of an appeal presupposes the recognition of the freedom in the other and so 
an acknowledgement of the possibility that “the truth” of our gift will not be acknowledged in 
a return gesture.94 Representative narrative judgement then does not eliminate the 
“dissymmetry” or the possibility of misrecognition between human consciousnesses. Rather 
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than complete reciprocity, its goal consists in the invigoration of communicability and 
sociability involved in the act of giving, receiving and giving in return. Constantly enriching 
the web of human relationships and illuminating the boundaries of the world, it is able to 
disclose a worldly space for a new beginning. 
 The political relevance of worldly engagement with literary works can be fruitfully 
illustrated by Camus’s play The Just. Published in 1949, the play relates the lived experience 
of the Russian socialist revolutionaries of 1905, who, in the struggle against an unjust political 
and economic system, decide to assassinate the Grand Duke Sergei. Camus’s aesthetic 
attentiveness to the ambiguity of political action and the attendant need for limits comes forth 
in the ruminations of the morally troubled assassin Ivan Kaliayev.95 While Kaliayev is 
determined to throw the bomb at the Duke’s carriage, he remains doubtful whether the fight 
against oppression justifies the killing of another human being and is willing to “pay” for his 
action by surrendering to the scaffold.96 The promise of confronting the ambiguity of political 
action through a dialogical judging sensibility most fully emerges in the exchange between 
Kaliayev and the Grand Duchess. After the death of her husband, the Duchess visits Kaliayev 
in prison and offers forgiveness. Yet, her act of empathy reduces his assassination to a morally 
wrong act of murdering a human being of flesh and blood, a man “who used to love the 
peasants.”97 She appeals to Kaliayev to assume responsibility by repenting for the suffering he 
has caused and thereby regain the (Christian) ideals of goodness and innocence.98 In response, 
Kaliayev insists that repentance would amount to a betrayal of the solidarity for the suffering 
people, and wishes to affirm the worldly significance of his act of resistance against the unjust 
system.99 We can observe how the Duchess’ attempt to reckon with the tragedy of political 
action rests on a certain despair, even resentment against the plurality and unpredictability of 
the world. Subsuming the particularity of the other under her own vision of moral community, 
she at the same time evades a reflection on her own situatedness in and responsibility for the 
21 
oppressive regime.100 In his insistence on sacrificing his own life, in contrast, Kaliayev exposes 
the unjust conditions of political action that have “[forced him] into crime,” but also refuses to 
justify violence, even in the service of a worthy ideal.101 Even though the dialogue does not 
lead to agreement, the exchange of differently situated perspectives nevertheless brings to light 
the contours of a shared world. It stirs into motion the process of understanding the given 
oppressive situation, carefully scrutinizing whether and how it might have legitimated a resort 
to violent means, as well as how to conceive of forms of political engagement in the future. 
 Here worldly narrative-inspired judgement highlights the significance of Camus’s notion of 
limits in relation to confronting the ambiguity of political action. While it holds that the 
meaning of a given situation cannot be imposed from above the human affairs, it also 
acknowledges that an assessment of resistance cannot be determined with reference to a pre-
given end. What representative judging sensibility thereby challenges is the moral focus of 
Nussbaum’s ethics of narrative, predominantly oriented to cultivating in the readers 
appropriate emotional responses. As manifested in the troubling implications of Maggie’s 
striving for proper vision, this detour via the self short-circuits the process of reconciling with 
worldly reality and again finds itself facing the world through preconceived standards. 
Nurturing a new escape into the realm of moral innocence that refuses to be tainted by the 
world, it risks atrophying into a failure to imagine a viable course of action or into a dangerous 
instrumentalisation of others for given ends. The dialogical perspective of The Just, in contrast, 
retains attention to the worldly contradictions of political action, opening the space where they 
can be confronted through an exchange between a plurality of perspectives.102 Thus, it also 
nurtures ongoing reflection on how our shared world should look like. Even if the play is a 
“testimony” to the justness of the resistance struggle, it nonetheless warns against elevating 
Kaliayev’s sacrifice to a new rule of action that instantiates “the purity of the ideal,” to be 
imitated in the future.  As voiced by the perspective of his fellow revolutionary Dora, 
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Kaliayev’s taking upon himself the world’s suffering might just as easily solidify into a new 
dogma: “perhaps others will come and justify themselves by our example and not pay with 
their lives!”103 
 The existential thinkers’ emphasis on worldly recognition can constantly invigorate a 
political space because, refusing to see others as substances that can be fully known, it 
dispenses with a view of them as objects “for” whom one should act.104 Representative 
judgement shifts the focus to how to broaden the individuals’ field of action, increase their 
potential to engage their freedom in practical projects in the world and have them taken up by 
others. For, by acknowledging different perspectives as rightful participants in the rebuilding 
and preservation of the common world, representative narrative engagement can pry open a 
space for their subjectivity to appear.105 If others can recognize a trace of their own subjectivity 
in our judgement, they are more likely to engage with it, correct or dispute it. Their stories, in 
turn, will present us with new aspects of the common world, and incite us to a continuous effort 
in mutual understanding. Such worldly judgement does not seek to offset the inherently 
unpredictable nature of political action. It remains aware that individuals’ perspectives may 
remain conflicting and that resistance to oppression might end up alienating others’ freedom. 
Nevertheless, it renounces any blind justification of violent means in terms of an abstract end 
of liberation – attentive to the fact that political action cannot happen in “a vacuum”106 but 





 The paper sought to contribute to current debates about the political significance of narrative 
imagination by drawing on Arendt’s and Camus’s aesthetic, representative judging sensibility. 
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Specifically, it displaced the prevalent tendency to probe literature for its moral-philosophical 
insights and instead delved into the experiential reality of our engagement with literary works. 
On this basis, it engaged a concern that animates the recent narrative turn, yet that remains 
insufficiently addressed by its primarily philosophical focus: how literary sensibility might 
help us confront the challenges of political judgement and action in our uncertain world shorn 
of absolute foundations. The article took as its starting point Nussbaum’s apt recognition of the 
ability of literary works to account for the tragedy of human affairs, yet found her account of 
the ethics of reading as self-cultivation wanting politically. Focusing on the narrative capacity 
to cultivate in the reader appropriate emotional responses, Nussbaum’s narrative ethics risks 
abstracting from the plurality of political affairs and falls short of reckoning with the ambiguity 
of political action. Camus’s and Arendt’s aesthetic judging sensibility, in contrast, emerged as 
explicitly political, constantly striving to evaluate the experiences of others in their 
intersubjective appearance and fostering a sense of the shared world between different 
individuals. Within this horizon, the value of narrative engagement does not lie in an eventual 
transcendence of subjective distortions and the reaching of a rational consensus on the correct 
course of action. Nor is the political import of narratives exhausted by adding to the discourse 
a competing perspective that would vie for victory with the existing ones. The existential 
thinkers’ worldly focus disclosed the political significance of narrative in its ability to evoke 
alternative forms of community and open a political space where the spectre of suffering and 
tragedy can be dealt with, acknowledging the limits of the world and those of different others. 
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